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1. Summary: This case is straight-lined with Vaughn 
v. Vermilion Corp., No. 77-1819. The two cases raise the common 
question whether a privately constructed or improved waterway e connected with navigable waters of the United States, navigable / 7e eke/;/~:; .6e/4i.-v £ ~ G:::7Se c:?;7/ Vo(Jy;f" .?,-e //J 
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in fact, and used or suitable for use in interstate commerce, is __,,, 
subject to a public navigation servitude. As explained in the ~-____ , _____________ ___ -
Preliminary Memorandum in Vaughn, that case raises additional 
questions about the imposition of such a servitude where the 
construction of the private waterway has impaired the 
navigability of natural waterways. 
2. Facts: For centuries prior to 1961, Kuapa Pond, on 
the Island of Oahu, was used to cultivate fish. Separated from 
the Pacific Ocean by a narrow barrier beach reinforced with a 
wall, the 523-acre pond was fully enclosed and only about two 
feet deep. Sluice gates allowed ocean water to enter at high 
tide, supplying the only communication between the pond and the 
ocean. 
In 1961 the owner of the pond and surrounding land 
leased them to a developer for construction of residences and a 
marina. (Both the owner and the developer are petitioners 
here.) The developer notified the Corps of Engineers of its 
plan to dredge the pond and a channel to link the pond with the 
ocean; the Corps made no objection. The developer subsequently 
dredged the pond to an average depth of six feet, built a 
marina, and constructed a channel between the pond and the ocean 
with a depth of eight feet and an overhead clearance of 13 feet 
(mw). Boat owners could purchase marina privileges; the only 
other commercial use of the marina was for the mooring of a 
small vessel used by the developer in promoting sales of lots 





The petrs have excluded from the pond all persons other 
than those who are residents of the surrounding development or 
patrons of the marina. To this end, they have used patrol boats 
to intercept and turn back other vessels entering the channel to 
the pond. The Corps of Engineers commenced this lawsuit to 
prevent such obstruction. The Corps sought a declaration that 
the waters of the pond are navigable waters of the United States 
and an order forbidding petitioners from continuing to bar 
members of the public from the pond. 
3. Decision Below: The CA 9 held that the waters of 
the pond are navigable waters of the United States. It noted 
that the waters of the pond are in fact navigable, and are 
connected directly with the ocean. The court rejected the 
petrs' contention that since the pond is owned privately and has 
never been used in interstate commerce, its waters are not 
navigable waters of the United States. Once a na~ural waterway 
is improved so as to make it navigable, the "capability of use 
by the public for the purposes of transportation or commerce" is 
the standard by which the authority of the United States is 
measured. United States v. Appalachin Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 
410 (1940). 
The CA 9 reversed the District Court's decision that 
although the waters of the pond are navigable waters of the 
United States, they are not subject to a navigation servitude. 
The District Court had based its decision on the legal status of 






fishpond -- the submerged lands and the waters of the pond --
constitute a single unit of property with all of the 
characteristics of any other piece of fast land. Accordingly, 
the District Court had reasoned, this private land could not be 
impressed with a navigation servitude unless the owners were 
compensated. 
The CA 9 remarked first that Kuapa Pond is no longer a 
fishpond, and that "[e]ven fast land appurtenant to a waterway 
can by excavation be submerged and rendered a part of the 
waterway and should this occur the land loses its character as 
fast land and takes on the character of submerged land." 
Petition, at 10a. Thus, even if a fishpond is the equivalent of 
fast land under state law, its conversion to a navigable marina 
destroys this special status. 
More broadly, the CA 9 concluded that the District 
Court had erred in referring to state property law at all. It 
reasoned, first, that federal regulatory control over navigable 
waters of the United States is inseparable from the right of 
public use. Second, the navigation servitude is not imposed or 
appropriated by the United States, but exists as a 
characteristic of all navigable waters of the United States. 
When the petrs improved the pond to render it navigable, they 
subjected it to this servitude. Third, Hawaiian property law 
may control the rights of the State to impose a servitude on the 
pond, but cannot affect the rights of the United States under 
the Commerce Clause. 




4. Contentions: The petrs contend that the pond is 
still a fishpond, and still privately owned, as far as Hawaiian 
law is concerned. They cite an Opinion of the State's Attorney 
General to this effect. They also point out that in the Act 
providing for the governance of the Territory of Hawaii, 
Congress recognized and preserved the system of private 
ownership of such fishponds under pre-existing Hawaiian law. 
The petrs next contend that a "limited federal 
regulatory authority" over the pond is separable from the 
imposition of a public navigation servitude. In particular, 
Corps authority to regulate dredging in the pond to prevent 
impairment of the navigability of the connecting ocean bay does 
not entail imposition of a navigation servitude. In support of 
this contention, the petrs cite 36 Op. U.S. Att'y Gen. 203 
(1930), which expresses the view that though an artificial 
waterway constructed by a State and used in interstate commerce 
is subject to the regulation of Congress, the federal government 
cannot take complete possession of the waterway without 
compensating the State. 
Finally, petrs contend that if there is a right of 
public access to the pond, they are entitled to just 
compensation for a taking of their property. 
In response, the SG cites numerous cases recognizing 
that navigable waters and the private lands over which they flow 
are subject to a servitude for public navigation. Based on this 






paid to affected landowners for economic losses resulting from 
exercise of the government's regulatory authority over navigable 
waters. The SG also points out that the United States has not 
sought to appropriate the pond to its exclusive use but only to 
prevent the obstruction of public navigation on the pond. 
The SG argues that Hawaiian property law cannot alter 
the rights created by the Commerce Clause over navigable waters 
of the United States. Thus, private ownership of underlying 
beds, and even private riparian rights under State law, must 
accommodate themselves to the public navigation servitude. He 
also contends that the private ownership of the waters of 
fishponds under State law was meant to protect the rights of 
their owners to harvest the fish cultivated there, and that 
conversion of Kuapa Pond to a marina has destroyed the rationale 
for private ownership of its waters. 
The SG also suggests that the case is not certworthy 
·becase the issue it presents is unlikely to recur. He cites the 
oractice of the Corps of Engineers to condition permits under 
the Rivers and Harbors Act for alteration of navigable waters on 
agreement by the permittees to allow free public navigation. 
The SG states that though the Corps did not exercise its 
authority when the petrs informed the Corps of their plans to 
dredge the pond and channel, "the Corps proposes to avoid such 
oversights in the future." 
5. Discussion: The SG's suggestion that the case is 







unpersuasive. But his defense of the merits of the CA 9's 
decision seems correct. 
As the SG acknowledges in his Brief as amicus curiae in 
Vaughn, supra, the decision of the Louisiana courts in that case 
is in conflict with the decision of the CA 9. The Louisiana 
courts rejected the argument that privately constructed canals, 
connected to navigable waters of the United States, navigable in 
fact, and used for commerce, are subject to a public navigation 
servitude. The cases might be distinguished on the ground that 
in Vaughn, the private waterways are canals constructed entirely 
by the private landowner, while in the present case the private 
owners improved an existing body of water. Kupua Pond was not 
navigable to any degree before these improvements, however, so 




There is a response. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-738 
Kaiser Aetna et al. , Petitioners, l On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of 
United States Appeals for the Ninth 
· Circuit. 
[November - , 1979] 
MR. J u sTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Hawaii Kai Marina was developed by the dredging 
and filling of Kuapa Pond, which was a shallow lagoon sepa-
rated from Maunalua Bay and the Pacific Ocean by a barrier 
beach. Although under Hawaii law Kuapa Pond was private 
property, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
when petitioners converted the pond into a marina and 
thereby connected it to the bay, it became subject to the 
"navigational servitude" of the Federal Government. Thus, 
the public acquired a right of access to what was once peti-
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importance of the issue and a conflict concerning the scope ~ 
and nature of the servitude.1 ~ _ -
I 1'o~~ 
Kuapa Pond was apparently created in the late Pleistocene ~
Period, near the end of the ice age, when the rising sea level / ' .,,,A_ 4 _ 
caused the shoreline to retreat, and partial erosion of the·~~ 
headlands adjacent to the bay formed sediment that accreted ~tl/J h _ 
to form a barrier beach at the mouth of the pond, creating a J/,e_ ~ 
1 In companion to this case, Vaughn"· Vermilion Corp., - U. S. - ---~ ..:.-~: _,J ~4 
(1979) , the Louisiana Court of Appeal held that privately constructed ~y__.--., 
canals, connected to navigable waters of the United States, navigable in  "--
fact, and used for commerce, are not subject to the federal navigational: /? -1 -_ A .J 





2 KAISER AETNA v. UNITED STATES 
lagoon. It covered 523 acres on the island of Oahu, Haw., 
and extended approximately two miles inland from Maunalua 
Bay and the Pacific Ocean. The pond was contiguous to the 
bay, which is a navigable waterway of the United States, but 
was separated from it by the barrier beach. 
Early Hawaiians used the lagoon as a fishpond and rein-
forced the natural sand bar with stone walls. Prior to the 
annexation of Hawaii, there were two openings from the pond 
to Maunalua Bay. The fishpond's managers placed removable 
sluice gates in the stone walls across these openings. Water 
from the bay and ocean entered the pond through the gates 
during high tide, and during low tide the current flow reversed 
toward the ocean. The Hawaiians used the tidal action to 
raise and catch fish such as mullet. 
Kuapa Pond, and other Hawaiian fishponds, have always 
been considered to be private property by landowners and by 
the Hawaiian government. Such ponds were once an integral 
part of the Hawaiian feudal system. And in 1848 they were 
allotted as parts of large land units, known as "Ahupuaas," by 
King Kamehameha III during the Great Mahele or royal land 
division. Titles to the fishponds were recognized to the same 
extent and in the same manner as rights in more orthodox 
fast land. Kuapa Pond was part of an ahupuaa that even-
tually vested in Bernice Pauahi Bishop and on her death 
formed a part of the trust corpus of petitioner Bishop Estate, 
the present owner. 
In 1961, Bishop Estate leased a 6,000 acre area, which in-
cluded Kuapa Pond, to petitioner Kaiser Aetna for subdivision 
development. The development is now known as "Hawaii 
Kai." Kaiser Aetna dredged-and filled parts of Kuapa Pond, 
erected retaining walls, and built bridges within the develop-
ment to create the Hawaii Kai Marina. Kaiser Aetna in-
creased the average depth of the channel from two to six feet. 
lt also created accommodations for pleasure boats and elimi-
nated the sluice gates. 
- -
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When petitioners notified the Corps of Engineers of their 
plans in 1961, the Corps advised them they were not required 
to obtain permits for the development of and operations in 
Kuapa Pond. Kaiser Aetna subsequently informed the Corps 
that it planned to dredge an 8-foot deep channel connecting 
Kuapa Pond to Maunalua Bay and the Pacific Ocean, and to 
increase the clearance of a bridge of the Kalania.naole High-
way-which had been constructed during the early 1900's 
along the barrier beach separating Kuapa Pond from the bay 
and ocean-to a maximum of 13.5 feet over the mean sea level. 
These improvements were made in order to allow boats from 
the marina to enter into and return from the bay, as well as 
to provide better waters. The Corps acquiesced in the pro-
posals, its chief of construction commenting only that the 
"deepening of the channel may cause erosion of the beach." 
At the time of trial, a marina-style community of approxi-
ma.tely 22,000 persons surrounded Kuapa Pond. It included 
approximately 1500 marina waterfront lot lessees. The water-
front lot lessees, along with at least 86 nonmarina lot lessees 
from Hawaii Kai and 56 boat owners who are not residents 
of Hawaii Kai , pay fees for maintenance of the pond and for 
patrol boa.ts that remove floating debris, enforce boating regu-
lations and maintain the privacy and security of the pond. 
Kaiser Aetna controls access to and use of the marina. It has 
generally not permitted commercial use, except for a small 
vessel, the Marina Queen, which could carry 25 passengers 
and was used for about five years to promote sales of marina 
lots and for a brief period by marina shopping center mer-
chants to attract people to their shopping facilities. 
In 1972, a dispute arose between petitioners and the Corps 
concerning whether ( 1) petitioners were require to obtain 
authorization from the Corps, in accordance with § 10 of the 
Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U. S. C. § 403 ( 1970) ,2 for future 
2 Title 33 U. S. C. § 403 provides : 
''The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Con, 
- -
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construction, excavation or filling in the marina, and (2) peti-
tioners were precluded from denying the public access to the 
pond because, as a result of the improvements, it had become 
a navigable water of the United States. The dispute fore-
seeably ripened into a lawsuit by the United States Govern-
ment against petitioners in the United States District Court 
for the District of Hawaii. In examining the scope of Con-
. gress' regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause, the 
District Court held that the pond was "navigable water of 
the United States" and thus subject to regulation by the 
Corps under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. 408 F. 
Supp. 42, - (Haw. 1976). It further held, however, that 
the government lacked the authority to open the now dredged 
pond to the public without payment of compensation to the 
· owner. Id., -. In reaching this holding, the District Court 
reasoned that although the pond was navigable for the pur-
pose of delimiting Congress' · regulatory power, it was not 
navigable for the purpose of defining the scope of the federal 
"navigational servitude" imposed by the Commerce Clause . 
Id., -. Thus, the District Court denied the Corps' request 
for an injunction to require petitioners to allow public access 
and to notify the public of the fact of the pond's accessibility. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's con-
gress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of t he United States 
is prohibited ; and it shall not be lawful to build or commence the building 
of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or 
other structures in any port , roadstead, haven , harbor, canal, na··igable 
river, or other water of the United States, outside established harbor lines, 
or where no harbor Jines have been established, except on plans recom-
mended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secreta ry of the 
Army ; and it shall not be lawful to excavat e or fill , or in any manner to 
alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port , 
roadstead, ha.ven, harbor, canal , like, harbor of refuge, or inclosure within 
the limits of any breakwater , or of the channel of any navigable water of 
the United States, unless the work has been recommended by the Chief 
of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to begin-
ning the same." 
- -
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clusion that the pond fell within the scope of Congress' regula-
tory authority, but reversed the District Court's holding that 
the navigational servitude did not require petitioners to grant 
the public access to the pond. 584 F. 2d 378 (CA9 1978). 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the "federal regulatory 
authority over navigable waters .. . and the right of public 
use cannot consistently be separated. It is the public right 
of navigational use that renders regulatory control necessary 
in the public interest." Id., -. The question before us is 
whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petition-
ers' improvements to Kuapa Pond caused its original character 
to be so altered that it became subject to an overriding federal 
navigational servitude, th us converting into a public aquatic 
park that which petitioners had invested millions of dollars 
in improving on the assumption that it was a privately owned 
pond leased to them .3 
II 
The Government contends that petitioners may not exclude 
members of the public from the Hawaii Kai Marina because 
"The public enjoys a federally protected right of navigation 
over the navigable waters of the United States." Brief of the 
United States, p. 13. It claims the issue in dispute is whether 
Kuapa Pond is presently a "navigable water of the United 
States." Ibid. When petitioners dredged and improved 
Kuapa Pond, the government continues, the pond-although 
it may once have qualified as fast land-became navigable 
water of the United States.4 The public thereby acquired a 
3 Petitioners do not challenge the Court of Appeals ' holding that the 
Hawaii Kai :\1arina is within the scope of Congress' regulatory power and 
subject to regulation by the Army Corps of Engineers pursuant to its 
authority under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U. S. C. § 403' 
(1970) . 
4 The Government further a rgues that: 
"The fact that the conversion was accomplished at private expense does· 
not exempt Kuapa Pond from the navigable waters of the United States. 
To allow landowners to dredge their fast land~ and re8hape the navigable-
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right to use Kuapa Pond as a continuous highway for naviga: 
tion, and the Corps of Engineers may consequently obtain 
an injunction to prevent petitioners from attempting to reserve 
the waterway to themselves. 
The position advanced by the Government, and adopted by 
the Court of Appeals below, presumes that the concept of 
"navigable waters of the United States" has a fixed meaning 
that remains unchanged in whatever context it is being 
' ' 
applied. While we do not fully agree with the reasoning of 
the District Court, we do agree with its conclusion that all of 
this Court's cases dealing with the authority of Congress to 
regulate navigation and the so-called "navigational servitude" 
cannot simply be lumped into one basket. Petition, p. 21a. 
As the District Court aptly stated, "any reliance upon judicial 
precedent must be predicated upon careful appraisal of the 
purpose for which the concept of 'navigability' was invoked in 
a particular case." Petition, p. 21a.5 
. It is true that Kuapa Pond may fit within definitions of 
"navigability" articulated in past decisions of this Court. But 
it must be recognized that the concept of navigability in these 
decisions was used for purposes other than to delimit the 
to exclude the public from the navigable portions flowing over the site of 
[armer fast lands, would unduly burden navigation and commerce. The 
states lack the power under the Commerce Clause to sanction any such 
form of private property .... " Brief for the United States, pp. 14-15. 
, 5 Petitioners contend that the term ''navigable waters of the United 
States," which has been traditionally employed to identify water subject 
to federal regulation and admiralt:v jurisdiction, see infra, "is so inherently 
unworkable with regard to Hawaiian fish ponds that it does not represent 
a meaningful or equitable standard under which public and private rights 
may be determined." Petition, p. 8. The efforts to distinguish "fast 
lands.. from public rights in waterways subject to the navigational 
servitude, however, has been the subject oJ litigation for more than a cen-
tury , and in the absence of something more unu::mal than the situation 
presented here it is the Hawaiian fish pond that must fit into the decisions 
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boundaries of the navigational servitude : for example, to 
define the scope of Congress' regulatory authority under the 
Interstate Commerce Clause, see, e. g., United States v. Ap-
palachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940), South Carolina v. 
Georgia, 93 U. S. (3 Otto) 4 (1876) , The Montello, 87 U. S. 
(20 Wall.) 430 (1874), The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. (10 Wall.) 
557 ( 1870), to determine the extent of the authority of the 
Corps of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 
1899.a and to establish the limits of the jurisdiction of federal 
courts, conferred by Art. III, § 2, of the United States -Consti-
tution, over admiralty and maritime cases.7 Although the 
Government is clearly correct in maintaining that the now 
dredged Kuapa Pond falls within the definition of "navigable 
waters" as this Court has used that term in delimiting the 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Republ-ic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) 
(deposit of iudustrial solid~ into river held to create an '·obstruction" to 
the "na.vigable caparity" of the river forbidden by § 10 of the Rivers and 
Harbors Act of 1899). 
The Corps of Engineer~ has adopted the following general definition of 
"navigable wnters": 
"Navigable waters of the United States are those waters that are subject 
to the ebb and Aow of the tide and/or are presently used , or have been 
used in the past, or ma~· be susceptible for use to transport interstate or 
foreign commerce. A determination of navigability, once made, applies 
laterally over the entire surface of the waterbody, and is not extinguished 
by later actions or events which impede or destroy navigable capacity." 
33 CFR § 329.4. 
7 "Na vigable water" subject to federal admiralty jurisdiction was defined 
::u, including waters that are navigable in fact in The Propeller G'enessee 
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U. S. (12 How.) -!43 (1851). See also, e. g., The 
Belfast. 74 U. S. (7 WaJl.) 624 (1868). And in Ex parte Bayer, 109 
U. S. 629 (1884), this Court held that such jurisdiction extended to artifi. 
cial hodies of water: 
"NaYigable watrr situatrd as thi;;: canal is, used for the purposes for which 
it is used, a highway for rommercc between ports and places in diffrrent 
States, carried on by \·e;;:sel;;: Ruch a;; those in que~tion here, is public water 
of the Unit<'d Stat<'s, and within the legitimate scope of the admiralty 
jurisdiction conferred by the Com,titution and statut es of the Unitecl 
- -
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boundaries of Congress' regulatory authority under the Com-
merce Clause, see, e. g., The Daniel Ball, supra, 77 U. S. (10 
Wall.) , at 563, The Montello, supra, 87 U. S. (20 Wall.), at 
407-408, United States v. Appalachian Power Co., supra, 311 
U. S., at 407-408Jthis Court has never held that the naviga-
tional servitude creates a blanket exception to the Takings 
Clause whenever Congress exercises its Commerce Clause au-
thority to promote navigation. Thus, while Kuapa Pond 
may be subject to regulation by the Corps of Engineers, acting 
under the authority delegated it by · Congress in the Rivers 
and Harbors Act, it does not follow that the pond is also 
subject to a public right of access. 
A 
Reference to the navigability of a waterway adds little if 
anything to the breadth of Congress' regulatory power over 
interstate commerce. It has long been settled that Congress 
has extensive authority over this Nation's waters under the 
Commerce Clause. Early in our history this Court held that 
the power to regulate commerce necessarily includes power 
over navigation. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 
189 (1824). As stated in Gilrnan v. Philadelphia, 70 U. S. 
(3 Wall.) 713, 724-725 : 
"Commerce includes navigation. The power to regu-
late Commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, 
States, even though the canal is wholly artificial, and is wholly within the 
body of a State, and subject to its ownen;hip and control ; and it makes no 
difference as to the jmisdiction of the district court that one or the other 
of the vessels was at the time of the collision on a voyage from one place 
in the State of Illinois to another place in that State." Id. , 632. 
Congress, pursuant to its authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause of Art. I to enact laws carrying into execution the powers vested 
in other departments of the Federal Government, has also been recognized 
as having the power to legi~late with regard to matters concerning ad-
miralty and maritime cases. Butler v. Boston Steamship Co., 130 U. S, 
527, 557 (1889) . See also, e.g., In re Garnett, 141 U. S. 1, 12 (1891) . 
- -
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and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters 
of the U nite<l States which are accessible from a state 
other than those in which they lie. For this purpose, 
they are the public property of the nation, and subject to 
all the requisite legislation by Congress." 
The pervasive nature of Congress' regulatory authority over 
national waters was more fully described in United States v. 
Appalachian Power Co., supra, 311 U. S., at 426-427 : 
" [I] t cannot properly be said that the constitutional 
power of the United States over its waters is limited to 
control for navigation . . . . In truth the authority of the 
United States is the regulation of commerce on its waters, 
navigability . . . is but part of this whole. Flood protec-
tion, watershed development, recovery of the cost of 
improvements through utilization of power are likewise 
parts of commerce control. . . . [The] authority is as 
broad as the needs of commerce. . . . The point is that 
navigable waters are subject to national planning and 
control in the broad regulation of commerce granted the 
federal government." 
Appalachian Power Co. indicates that congressional author-
ity over the waters of this Nation does not depend on a 
stream's "navigability." And, as demonstrated by this Court's 
decisions in N LRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 
1 (1937) , United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100 (1941) , and 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942) , a wide spectrum 
of economic activities "affect" interstate commerce and thus 
are susceptible of congressional regulation under the Com-
merce Clause irrespective of whether navigation, or, indeed, 
water, is involved. With respect to the Hawaii Kai Marina, 
for example, there is no doubt that Congress may prescribe 
the rules of the road, define the conditions under which run-
ning lights shall be displayed, require the removal of obstruc-
'tions to navigation, and exercise its authority for such other 
- -
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reason as may seem to it in the interest of furthering naviga-
tion or commerce. 
B 
In light of its expansive authority under the Commerce 
Clause, there is no question but that Congress could assure 
the public a free right of access to the Hawaii Kai Marina 
if it so chose. Whether a statute or regulation that went so 
far amounted to a "taking," however, is an entirely separate 
question.8 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 
415 (1922). As was recently pointed out in Penn. Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 46 U. S. L. W. 4856 
( 1978), this Court has generally "been unable to develop any 
'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' re-
quire that economic injuries caused by public action be com-
pensated by the Government, rather than remain dispropor-
tionately concentrated on a few persons." Id., at 4862. 
Rather, it has examined the "taking" question by engaging in 
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several 
factors-such as the economic impact of the regulation, its 
interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, 
and the character of the governmental action-that have par-
ticular significance. Ibid. When the "taking" question has 
involved the exercise of the public right of navigation over 
interstate waters that constitute highways for commerce, how-
ever, this Court has held in many cases that compensation 
may not be required as a result of the federal na.viga.tional 
servitude. See, e. g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar, 
229 U. S. 53 (1913) . 
C 
The navigational servitude is an expression of the notion 
that the determination whether a taking has occurred must 
8 Thu~, this Court has observed that "Confiscation may result from a 
taking of the use of property without compensation quite as well as from 
the taking of title." Chicago, R . I . & P . R. Co . v. United States, 284 
·V. S. 80, 96 (1931). 
- -• 
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take into consideration the important public interest in the 
flow of interstate waters that in their natural condition are in 
fact capable of supporting public navigation. Thus, in United 
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., supra, 229 U. S., at 66, this 
Court stated "that the running water in a great navigable 
stream is [in]capable of private ownership .. .. " And, in 
holding that a riparian landowner was not entitled to com-
pensation when the construction of a pier cut off his access 
to navigable water, this Court observed : 
"The primary use of the waters and the lands under them 
is for purposes of navigation, and the erection of the piers 
in them to improve navigation for the public is entirely 
consistent with such use, and infringes no right of the 
ripa.rian owner. Whatever the nature of the interest of 
a riparian owner in the submerged lands in front of his 
upland bordering on a public navigable water, his title is 
not as full and complete as his title to fast land which has 
no direct connection with the navigation of such water. 
It is a qua.lified title. a mere technical title, not at his 
disposal, as is his upland, but to be held at all times sub-
ordinate to such use of the submerged lands and of the 
waters flowing over them as may be consistent with or 
demanded by the public right of navigation." Scranton 
v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900) . 
For over a century, a long line of cases decided by this 
Court involving government condemnation of "fast lands" 
delineated the elements of compensable damages that the 
government was required to pay because the lands were 
riparian to navigable streams. The Court was often deeply 
divided, and the results frequently turned on what could fairly 
be described as quite narrow distinctions. But this is not a 
case in which the government recognizes any obligation what-
ever to condemn "fast lands" and pay just compensation under 
the Eminent Domain Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
"Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. It is in-
- -
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stead a case in which the owner of what was once a private 
pond. separated from concededly navigable water by a barrier 
beach and used for aquatic agriculture, has invested substan-
tial amounts of money in making improvements. · The 
government contends that as a result of one of these improve-
ments, the pond's connection to the navigable water in a 
manner approved by the Corps of Engineers, the owner has 
somehow lost one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of 
rights that are commonly characterized as property-the right 
to exclude others. 
Because the factual situation in this case is so different 
from typical ones involved in riparian condemnation cases 
we see little point in tracing the historical development of 
that doctrine here. Indeed, since this Court's decision in 
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967) , closely fol-
lowing its decisions in United States v. Virginia Electric & 
Power Co., 365 U. S. 624, 628 (1"961), and United States v . 
Twin Cit Power Co. 350 U. S. 222, 226 (1956) , the ele-
men s of compensation for which e Government must pay 
when it condemns fast lands riparian to a navigable stream 
has remained largely settled. Distinctions between cases 
such as these, on the one hand, and United States v. Kansas 
. City Insurance Co., 399 U.S. 799, 808 (1950), may seem fine, 
indeed, in the light of hindsight, but perhaps for the very 
reason that it is hindsight which we now exercise. the shifting 
back and forth of the Court in this area until the most recent 
decisions bears the sound of "Old, unhappy, far off things, and 
battles long ago." 
· There is no denying that the strict logic of the more recent 
cases limiting the Government's liability to pay damages for 
riparian access, if carried to its ultimate conclusion, might 
completely swallow up any private claim for "just compensa-
tion" under the Fifth Amendment even in a situation as 
different from the riparian condemnation cases as this one. 
But, as Mr. Justice Holmes observed in a very different 
- -
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context, the life of the law has not been logic, it has been 
experience. The navigational servitude, which exists by 
virtue of the Commerce Clause in navigable streams, gives 
rise to an authority in the Government to assure that such 
streams retain their capacity to serve as continuous highways 
for the purpose of navigation in interstate commerce. Thus, 
when the Government acquires fast lands to improve naviga-
tion, it is not required under the Eminent Domain Clause to 
compensate land owners for certain elements of damage 
attributable to riparian location, such as the land's value as a 
hydro-electric site, Twin City Power Co., supra, or a port site, 
United States v. Rands, supra. But none of these cases ever 
doubted that when the Government wished to acquire fast 
lands, it was required by the Eminent Domain Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to condemn and pay fair value for that 
interest. See United States v. Kansas City Life Insurance 
Co., supra, at 800 (1950); United States v. Virgini,a Electric & 
Power Co., 365 U.S., at 628 (1961); United States v. Rands, 
389 U. S., at 123 (1967). The nature of the navigational 
servitude when invoked by the Government in condemnation 
cases is summarized as well as anywhere in United States v. 
Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 : 
"It is clear, of course, that a head of water has value and 
that the Company has an economic interest in keeping 
the St. Croix at the lower level. But not all economic 
interest are 'property rights'; only those economic ad-
vantages are 'rights' which have the law back of them, 
and only when they are so recognized may courts compel 
others to forbear from interfering with them or to com-
pensate for their invasion." 
We think, however, that when the Government makes the 
naked assertion it does here, that assertion collides with not 
merely an "economic advantage" but an "economic advan-
tage" that has the law back of it to such an extent that courts 
may "compel others to forbear from interfering with [it] or 
- -
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to compensate for [its] invasion." United States v. Willow 
River Co., supra, 502. 
Here the Government's attempt to create a public right of 
access to the improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary regu-
lation or improvement for navigation as to amount to a tak-
ing under the logic of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra. 
A numb ... er of J actors contribute to this result, no one of them 
byitself being dispositive. It is clear that prior to its irn-
provem~1t, Kuapa P; nd was incapable of being used as a 
continuous highway for the purpose of navigation in inter-
state commerce. Its maximum depth at high tide was a mere 
two feet, it was separated from the adjacent bay and ocean by 
a natural barrier beach , and its principal commercial va1ue 
was limited to fishing. 0 It consequently is not the sort of 
"great navigable stream" that this Court has previously recog-
nized as being "[in]capable of private ownership." See, e.g., 
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar, supra, 389 U. S., at 66; 
United States v. Twin City Power Co., supra, 350 U. S., at 
I 228. And, as previously noted. Kuapa Pond has always been 
/ considered to be private property under Hawai~ us, 
the interes o pet1 10ners in e n re ged marina is 
strikingly similar to that of owners of fast land adjacent to 
navigable water. And while we do not rest our holding on 
any principle of estoppel of the government by its agents, see 
Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U. S. 308, 314-315 (1968), it 
cannot be entirely disregarded that the Corps of Engineers 
gave its full approval to the petitioners' project as a profit-
making enterprise at the time that petitioners sought to 
dredge a channel from the pond into the arm of the bay and 
to build a bridge over the channel. 
We have not the slightest doubt that the Government could 
0 While it was still a fish pond, a few flat-bottomed shallow draft boats 
were operated b~, the fo;hermen in their work. There is no evidence, how-
ever, that even these boats could acquire access to the adjacent bay ancJ 
ocean from the pond. 
- -
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have refused to allow such dredging on the ground tha.t it 
would have impaired navigation in the bay, or could have con-
ditioned its approval of the dredging-if such approval had 
been required at the time the marina was constructed--on 
petitioners' agreement comply with various measures that it 
deemed appropriate for the promotion of the public right of 
navigation. But what petitioners now have is a body of 
water that was private property under Hawaiian law, linked 
to navigable water by a channel dredged by them with the 
consent of the respondent. While the consent of individual 
officials representing the United States cannot "estop" the 
United States, see Montana v. Kennedy, supra, it can lead 
to the fruition of a number of expectancies embodied in the 
concept of "property,"-expectancies that, if sufficiently im-
portant. the Government must condemn and pay for before 
it takes over the management of the land owner's property. 
In this case, we hold that the "right to exclude," so univer-
sally held to be a fundamental element of the property right,1-0 
falls within this category of interests that the Government 
cannot take without compensation. This is not a case in 
which the Government is exercising its regulatory in a manner 
that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' 
private property; rather, the imposition of the navigational 
servitude in this context will result in an actual physical in-
vasion of the privately owned marina. Compare Andrus v. 
Allard, No. 78-740, slip op., at 14-15, with the traditional 
taking of fee interests in United States ex rel. TV A v. Powel-
son, 319 U.S. 266 (1943), and in United States v. Miller, 317 
U. S. 369 (1943). And even if the Government physically 
invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay 
10 See, e. g .. United States v. P'Ueblo of San Ildefonso , 513 F. 2d 1383, 
1394 (U. S. Ct. Cl. 1975); United States v. L'Utz, 295 F . 2d 736, 740 (CA5 
1961) . As stated by Justice Brandeis, "An essential element. of individual 
vroperty is the legal right to exclude others from enjoying it." Inter-
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just compensation. See United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 
256, 265 (1946); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 
327 (1922). Thus, if the Government wishes to make what 
was formerly Kuapa Pond into a public aquatic park after 
petitioners have proceeded as far as they have here, it may 
not, without invoking its eminent domain power and paying 
just compensation, require them to allow free access to the 
dredged pond while petitioners' agreement with their cus-
tomers calls for an annual $72 regular fee. 
Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
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MEME>RANl:>tJM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 5 November 1979 
From: Gregory May 
No. 78-738: Kaiser - Aetna · v~ · tJnited - States 
No. 77-1819: Va• ghan - v~ · Vermilion · eorp; 
(1) At pages 14-15 of the draft in Kaiser - Aetna, Mr. 
Justice Rehnquist seems to rest the decision on three grounds: 
( 1) that Kuapa Pond in its natural state was not capable of 
sustaining interstate navigation, ( 2) that the Pond has always 
been considered private property under state law, and (3) that 
the actions of Government agents gave rise to expectancies 
entitled to protection. He says that no one of these grounds by 
itself would be dispositive. P. 14. 
Despite his protestations to the contrary, Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist's last ground for decision seems to cut back on the 
notion that the Government cannot be estopped by the acts of its 
agents. Perhaps that notion wants some cutting back, but this 
case does not require it. The first two grounds seem adequate 
to support the result. 
• 
; · - - 2. 
My only other observation about the draft is that it 
seems to make a rather ad - hoc determination, rather than clearly 
establishing the principle that private, naturally non-naviqable 
waterways are not subject to a public right of access even after 
they have been improved. Perhaps the underlying problem is the 
refusal to believe that the navigational servitude is broader 
than and different from the public right of access. (The draft 
also cites the troubling paragraph at pp. 14-15 of the opinion 
in No. 78-740, Andrns - v~ -Allard.) 
( 2) The per curiam in 'iianghan is unexceptional, save 
that the word "other" in the first line of the third paragraph 
inadvertently suggests that the canals at issue also were 
naturally navigable. Since the Court now leaves open the 
distinct quest ion of law presented in this case, it probably 








I woulrt appreciat€' your considering one suggestion 
for a change in your otherwise fine o~inion. 
On p age 14 you rest the a~cision on t~ree grounds: 
(i) that Kuapa Pona in its natural state was not capable of 
sustaininq interstate navigation, (ii) that the pond has 
always been considered orivate property under state law, and 
(iii) that the actions of governrn~nt Fgents g~v~ rise to 
expectancies entitled to prot~ctio~. Tp~ troublesom~ point 
for ~e is that you state "no on~ [of these factors . is] by 
itself ••• dispositive." (p. 14) 
:._ 
I had thought we had voted in favor of a general 
principle that private, naturally non-navigable waterways are 
not subject to a public right of access even af,ter they have 
been improved. I woulo prefer establishing this principle. 
~t least it seems to me, we should say that we need 
not decide whether any one or two of the factors alone would 
be dis9ositive. For example, if the pond in this case had 
been ten feet deep, but separated from all interstate 
waterways by a natural barrier, and was private property 
under state law, 1 would think our decision would be the 
same. Also, I c8n imagine situations - possibly it could 
said of this case - whera the government was estopped by 
virtue of action that allowed , if not specifically 
encouraged, the owner of a pond or stream to develop it into 
an attractive lake as a centerpiece of a major real estate 
development. People who had purchased homes, as well as the 
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[November -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Hawaii Kai Marina was developed by the dredging 
and filling of Kuapa Pond, which was a shallow lagoon sepa-
rated from Maunalua Bay and the Pacific Ocean by a barrier 
beach. Although under Hawaii law Kuapa Pond was private 
property, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
when petitioners converted the pond into a marina and 
thereby connected it to the bay, it became subject to the 
"navigational servitude" of the Federal Government. Thus, 
the public acquired a right of access to what was once peti-
tioners' private pond. We granted certiorari because of the 
importance of the issue and a conflict concerning the scope 
and nature of the servitude.1 
I 
Kuapa Pond was apparently created in the late Pleistocene 
Period, near the end of the ice age, when the rising sea level 
caused the shoreline to retreat, and partial erosion of the 
headlands adjacent to the bay formed sediment that accreted 
to form a barrier beach at the mouth of the pond, creating a 
1 In companion to this case, Vaughn v. Vermil-ion Corp ., - P. S. -
(19i9) , the Loui,;iana Court of Appeal held t hat privately con~1 ructed 
canals, connected to navigable waters of the United Sta.tes, naviga ble in 
fact , and used for commerce, are not subject to the federal navigationaf 
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lagoon. It covered 523 acres on the island of Oahu, Haw., 
and extended approximately two miles inland from Maunalua 
Bay and the Pacific Ocean. The pond was contiguous to the 
bay, which is a navigable waterway of the United States, but 
was separated from it by the barrier beach. 
Early Hawaiians used the lagoon as a fishpond and rein-
forced the natural sand bar with stone walls. Prior to . the 
annexation of Hawaii, there were two openings from the pond 
to Maunalua Bay. The fishpond's managers placed removable 
sluice gates in the stone walls across these openings. Water 
from the bay a.nd ocean entered the pond through the gates 
during high tide, and during low tide the current flow reversed 
toward the ocean. The Hawaiians used the tidal action to 
raise and catch fish such as mullet. 
Kuapa Pond, and other Hawaiian fishponds, have always 
been considered to be private property by landowners and by 
the Hawaiian government. Such ponds were once an integral 
part of the Hawaiian feudal system. And in 1848 they were 
allotted as parts of large land units, known as "Ahupuaas," by 
King Kamehameha III during the Great Mahele or royal land 
division. Titles to the fishponds were recognized to the same 
extent and in the same manner as rights in more orthodox 
fast land. Kuapa Pond was part of an ahupuaa that even-
tually vested in Bernice Pauahi Bishop and on her death 
formed a part of the trust corpus of petitioner Bishop Estate, 
the present owner. 
In 1961, Bishop Estate leased a 6,000 acre area, which in-
cluded Kuapa Pond, to petitioner Kaiser Aetna for subdivision 
development. ·The development is now known as "Hawaii 
Kai." Kaiser Aetna dredged and filled parts of Kuapa Pond, 
erected retaining walls, and built bridges within the develop-
ment to create the Hawaii Kai Marina.. Kaiser Aetna in-
creased the average depth of the channel from two to six feet. 
It also created accommodations for pleasure boats and elimi--
nat_ed the sluice gates. 
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"When petitioners notified the Corps of Engineers of their 
plans in 1961, the Corps advised them they were not required 
to obtain permits for the development of and operations in 
Kuapa Pond. Kaiser Aetna subsequently informed the Corps 
that it planned to dredge an 8-foot deep channel connecting 
Kuapa Pond to Maunalua Bay and the Pacific Ocean, and to 
increase the clearance of a bridge of the Kalanianaole High-
way-which had been constructed during the early 1900's 
along the barrier beach separating Kuapa Pond from the bay 
and ocean-to a maximum of 13.5 feet over the mean sea level. 
These improvements were made in order to allow boats from 
the marina to enter into and return from the bay, as well as 
to provide better waters. The Corps acquiesced in the pro-
posals, its chief of construction commenting only that the 
"deepening of the channel may cause erosion of the beach." 
At the time of trial, a marina-style community of approxi-
mately 22,000 persons surrounded 'Kuapa Pond. It included 
approximately 1500 marina waterfront lot lessees. The water-
front lot lessees, along with at least 86 nonma.rina lot lessees 
from Hawaii Kai and 56 boat owners who are not residents 
of Hawaii Kai, pay fees for maintenance of the pond and for 
patrol boats that remove floating debris, enforce boating regu-
la.tions and maintain the privacy and security of the pond. 
Kaiser Aetna controls access to and use of the marina. It has 
generally not permitted commercial use, except for a small 
vessel, the Marina Queen, which could carry 25 passengers 
and was used for about five years to promote sales of marina 
lots and for a brief period by marina shopping center mer-
chants to attract people to their shopping facilities. 
In 1972, a dispute arose between petitioners and the Corps 
'i concerning whether (1) petitioners were required to obtain 
authorization from the Corps, in accordance with § 10 of the 
Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S. C. § 403 (1970) ,2 for future 
2 Title 33 U. S. C. § 403 provides: 
"Tlie creation of any obstniction not affirmatively authorized by Con-. 
- -
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construction, excavation or filling in the marina, and (2) peti-
tioners were precluded from denying the public access to the 
pond because, as a result of the improvements, it had become 
a navigable water of the United States. The dispute fore-
seeably ripened into a lawsuit by the United States Govern-
ment against petitioners in the United States District Court 
for the District of Hawaii. In examining the scope of Con-
gress' regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause, the 
District Court held that the pond was "navigable water of 
the United States" and thus subject to regula.tion by the 
Corps under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. 408 F. 
Supp. 42, - (Haw. 1976). It further held, however, that 
the government lacked the authority to open the now dredged 
pond to the public without payment of compensation to the 
owner. Id.,-. In reaching this holding. the District Court 
reasoned that although the pond was navigable for the pur-
pose of delimiting Congress' regulatory power, it was not 
navigable for the purpose of defining the scope of the federal 
"navigational servitude" imposed by the Commerce Clause. 
Id., -. Thus, the District Court denied the Corps' request 
for an injunction to require petitioners to allow public access 
and to notify the public of the fact of the pond's accessibility. 
The Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court's con-
gress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States 
is prohibited; and it 8hall not be lawful to build or commence the building 
of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or 
other structures in any port, roadstead, haven , harbor, canal, navigable 
river, or other water of the United States, outside e:;tablished harbor lines, 
or where no ha rbor Jines have been established, except on plans recom-
mended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the 
Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to 
alter or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, 
roadstead, hnven, harbor, canal, like, harbor of refuge, or inclosure within 
the limit8 of any breakwater, or of the channel of any navigable water of 
the United States. unless the work has been recommended by the Chief 
of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to begin-. 
· J)\ng the sam,e/' 
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clusion that the pond fell within the scope of Congress' regula-
tory authority, but reversed the District Court's holding that 
the navigational servitude did not require petitioners to grant 
the public access to the pond. 584 F. 2d 378 (CA9 1978) . 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the "federal regulatory 
authority over navigable waters .. . and the right of public 
use cannot consistently be separated. It is the public right 
of navigational use that renders regulatory control necessary 
in the public interest." Id., -. The question before us is 
whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petition-
ers' improvements to Kuapa Pond caused its original character 
to be so altered that it became subject to an overriding federa.l 
navigational servitude, thus converting into a public aquatic 
park that which petitioners had invested millions of dollars 
in improving on the assumption that it was a privately owned 
pond leased to them.3 
II 
The Government contends that petitioners may not exclude 
members of the public from the Hawaii Kai Marina because, 
"The public enjoys a federally protected right of navigation 
over the navigable waters of the United States." Brief of the 
United States, p. 13. It claims the issue in dispute is whether 
Kuapa Pond is presently a "navigable water of the United 
States." Ibid. When petitioners dredged and improved 
Kuapa Pond, the government continues, the pond-although 
it may once have qualified as fast land-became navigable 
water of the United States.4 The public thereby acquired a 
3 Petitioner;: do not challenge the Court of Appeals' holding that the 
Hawaii Kai Marina is within the scope of Congress' regulatory power and 
subject to regulation by the Army Corps of Engineers pursuant to its 
authority under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbor.; Act, 33 U. S. C. § 403 
(1970) . 
4 The Government further argues that: 
"The fact that the conversion was accompli::;hed at private expense does 
not exempt Kuapa Pond from the navigable water;; of the United States. 
To allow landowners to dredge their fast lands and reshape the navigable 
w~ters of the United States to more conveniently serve their land, and then 
- -
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right to use Kuapa Pond as a continuous highway for naviga-
tion, and the Corps of Engineers may consequently obtain 
an injunction to prevent petitioners from attempting to reserve 
the waterway to themselves. 
The position advanced by the Government, and adopted by 
the Court of Appeals below, presumes that the concept of 
"navigable waters of the United States" has a fixed meaning 
that remains unchanged in whatever context it is being 
applied. While we do not fully agree with the reasoning of 
the District Court, we do agree with its conclusion that all of 
this Court's cases dealing with the authority of Congress to 
regulate navigation and the so-called "navigational servitude" 
cannot simply be lumped into one basket. Petition, p. 21a. 
As the District Court aptly stated, "any reliance upon judicial 
precedent must be predicated upon careful appraisal of the 
purpose for which the concept of 'navigability' was invoked in 
a particular case." Petition, p. 21a.ij 
It is true that Kuapa Pond may fit within definitions of 
"navigability" articulated in past decisions of this Court. But 
it must be recognized that the concept of navigability in these 
decisions was used for purposes other than to delimit the 
to exclude the public from the navigable portions flowing over the site of 
former fast lands, would unduly burden navigation and commerce. The 
states lack the power under the Commerce Clause to sanction any such 
form of private property . ... " Brief for the United States, pp. 14-15. 
5 Petitioners contend that the term ''navigable waters of the United 
States," which has been traditionally employed to identify water subject 
to federal regulation and admiralty jurisdiction, see infra, "is so inherently 
unworkable with regard to Hawaiian fish ponds t hat it does not represent 
a meaningful or equitable standard under which public and private rights 
may be ·determined." Petition, p. 8. The efforts to distinguish "fast 
lands" from public rights in waterways subject to the navigational 
servitude, however, has· been the subject of litigation for more than a cen-
tury, and in the absence of something more unu,,mal than the situation 
presented here it is the Hawaiian fish pond tha.t must fit into the decisions 
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boundaries of the navigational servitude: for example, to 
define the scope of Congress' regulatory authority under the 
Interstate Commerce Clause, see, e. g., United States v. Ap-
palachian Power Co., 311 U. S. 377 (1940), South Carolina v. 
Georgia, 93 U. S. (3 Otto) 4 (1876), The Montello, 87 U. S. 
(20 Wall.) 430 (1874), The Daniel Ball, 77 U. S. (10 Wall.) 
557 ( 1870) , to determine the extent of the authority of the 
Corps of Engineers under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 
1899,6 and to establish the limits of the jurisdiction of federal 
courts, conferred by Art. III, § 2, of the United States Consti-
tution, over admiralty and maritime cases.7 Although the 
Government is clearly correct in maintaining that the now 
dredged Kuapa Pond falls within the definition of "navigable 
waters" as this Court has used that term in delimiting the 
1i See, e. g., United Sf:-Otes v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U. S. 482 (1960) 
( deposit of industrial solids into river held to create an "obstruction" to 
the "navigable capacity" of the river forbidden by § 10 of the Rivers and 
Ha.rbors Act of 1899). 
The Corps of Engineers has adopted the following general definition of 
''navigable waters" : 
"Navigable waters of the United States are those waters that are subject 
to t.he ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have been 
used in the past, or may be susceptible for use to transport interstate or 
foreign commerce. A determhrntion of navigability, once made, applies 
fatera-Ily over the entire surface of the waterbody, and is not extinguished 
by la.tel' actions or events which impede or destroy navigable capacity." 
33 CFR § 329.4. 
7 "Navigable water" subject to federal admiralty jurisdiction was defined 
as including waters that are navigable in fact in The Propeller Oenessee 
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U. S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). See also, e. g., The 
Belfast . 14 U. S. (7 Wall.) 624 (1868). And in Ex parte Boyer, 109 
U.S. 629 (1884), this Court held that such jurisdiction extended to artifi-
cia.I bodies of water: 
"Navigable water situated as this canal is. used for the purposes for which 
it is used, a highway for commerce between ports and places in different 
States, carried on by vessel:; such as those in question here, is public water 
of the United States, and within the legitimate scope of the admiralty 
jurisqiction conferred by the C9n~tit~itiop and statl)te:s of the Uriited 
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boundaries of Congress' regulatory authority under the Com-
merce Clause, see, e. g., The Daniel Ball, supra, 77 U. S. (10 
Wall.), at 563, The Montello, supra, 87 U. S. (20 Wall.) , at 
407-408, United States v. Appalachian Power Co., supra, 311 
U. S., at 407-408)this Court has never held that the naviga-
tional servitude creates a blanket exception to the Takings 
Clause whenever Congress exercises its Commerce Clause au-
thority to promote navigation. · Thus, while Kuapa Pond 
may be subject to regulation by ·the Corps ofEngineers, acting 
under the authority delegated it by Congress in the Rivers 
and Harbors Act, it does not follow that the pond is also 
subject to a public right of access. 
A 
Reference to the navigability of a waterway adds little if 
anything to the breadth of Congress' regulatory power over 
interstate commerce. It has long been settled· that Congress 
has extensive authority over this ·Nation's waters under the 
Commerce Clause. Early in our history this Court held that 
the power to regulate commerce necessarily includes power 
over navigation. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 
189 (1824). As stated in Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U. S. 
(3 Wall.) 713, 724-725: 
"Commerce i11cludes navigation. · The power to regu-
late Commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, 
States, even though the canal is wholly art ificial, and is wholly within the 
body of a State, and subject to its ownership and control; and it makes no 
difference as to the jurisdiction of the district conrt that one or t he other 
of the vessels was at the time of the collision on a voyage from one place 
in the State of Illinois to another place in that .State." Id., 632. 
Congress, pursuant to its authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause of Art . I to enact laws ca rrying into execution the powers vested 
in other departments of the Federal Government, has a.h,o bePn recognized 
as having the power to· legislate with rega rd to matters concerning ad-
miralty and maritime cases. Butler v. Boston Steamship Co., 130 U. S .. 
"-527, 557 (1SS9). See also, e.g., In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 12 (1891'). _ 
- -
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and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters 
of the United States which are accessible from a state 
other than those in which they lie. For this purpose, 
they are the public property of the nation, and subject to 
all the requisite legislation by Congress." 
The pervasive nature of Congress' regulatory authority over 
national waters was more fully described in United States v. 
Appalachian Power Co., supra, 311 U. S., at 426-427: 
"[I]t cannot properly be said that the constitutional 
power of the United States over its waters is limited to 
control for navigation. . . . In truth the authority of the 
United States is the regulation of commerce on its waters, 
navigability ... is but part of this whole. Flood protec-
tion, watershed development, recovery of the cost of 
improvements through utilization of power are likewise 
parts of commerce control. . . . [The] authority is as 
broad as the needs of commerce. . . . · The point is that 
navigable waters are subject to national planning and 
control in the broad regulation of commerce granted the 
federal government." 
Appalachian Power Co. indicates that congressional author-
ity over the waters of this Nation does not depend on a 
stream's "navigability." And, as demonstrated by this Court's 
decisions in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 
l(i937) , United Btates v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) , and 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942), a wide spectrum 
of economic activities "affect" interstate commerce and thus 
are susceptible of congressional regulation under the Com-
merce Clause irrespective of whether navigation, or, indeed,, 
water, is involved. With respect to the Hawaii Kai Marina, 
for example, there is no doubt that Congress may prescribe 
the rules of the road, define the conditions under which run .. 
ning lights shall be displayed, require the removal of obstruc-
,tions to navigation) and exercise its authority for such other 
- -
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reason as may seem to it in the interest of furthering naviga-
tion or commerce. 
B 
In light of its expansive authority under the Commerce 
Clause, there is no question but that Congress could assure 
the public a free right of access to the Hawaii Kai Marina 
if it so chose. Whether a statute or regulation that went so 
far amounted to a "taking," however, is an entirely separate 
· question.8 Pennsylvania -Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 
. 415 (1922). As was recently pointed out in Penn. Central 
Transportation Co. v. -City of New York, 46 U.S. L. "\i\T. 4856 
(1978), this Court has generally "been unable to develop any 
'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' re-
quire that economic injuries caused by public action be com-
pensated by the Government, rather than remain dispropor-
tionately concentrated on a few persons." Id., at 4862. 
Rather, it has examined the "taking" question by engaging in 
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have identified several 
factors-such as the economic impact of the regulation, its 
interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, 
and the character of the governmental action-that have par-
ticular significance . . Ibid . . -·when the "taking" question has 
involved the exercise of the public right of navigation over 
interstate waters that constitute highways for commerce, how-
ever, this Court has held in many cases that compensation 
may not be required as a result of the federal naviga.tional 
servitude. See, e. (!., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar, 
229 u. s. 53 (1913). 
C 
The navigational servitude is an expression of the notion 
that the determination whether a taking has occurred must 
8 Thus, this Court has · observed that "Confiscation may result from a 
taking of the use of property without compensation quite as well as from 
the taking of title ." Chicago; R. I. & P. R . Co. v. United States, 284 
1J, s. 80,' 96 (19'31). 
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take into consideration the important public interest in the 
flow of interstate waters that in their natural condition are in 
I fact capable of supporting public navigation. See United Sfates v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316 (1917). Thus, in United 
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., supra, 229 U. S., at 66, this 
Court stated "that the running water in a great navigable 
stream is [in]capable of private ownership .... " And, in 
holding that a riparian landowner was not entitled to com-
pensation when the construction of a pier cut off his access 
to navigable water, this Court observed: 
"The primary use of the waters and the lands under them 
is for purposes of navigation, and the erection of the piers 
in them to improve navigation for the public is entirely 
consistent with such use, and infringes no right of the 
riparian owner. Whatever the nature of the interest of 
a riparian owner in the submerged lands in front of his 
upland bordering on a public navigable water, his title is 
not as full and complete as his title to fast land which has 
no direct connection with the navigation of such water. 
It is a qualified title, a mere technica.l title, not at his 
disposal, as is his upland, but to be held at all times sub-
ordinate to such use of the submerged lands and of the 
waters flowing over them as may be consistent with or 
demanded by the public right of navigation." Scranton 
v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141, 163 (1900). 
For over a century, a long line of cases decided by this 
Court involving government condemnation of "fast lands" 
delineated the elements of compensable damages that the 
government was required to pay because the lands were 
riparian to navigable streams. The Court was often deeply 
divided, and the results frequently turned on what could fairly 
be described as quite narrow distinctions. But this is not a 
case in which the government recognizes any obligation what-
ever to condemn "fast lands" and pay just compensation under 
the Eminent Domain Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
- -
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Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. It is in-
stead a case in which the owner of what was once a private 
pond, separated from concededly navigable water by a barrier 
beach and used for aquatic agriculture, has invested substan-
tial amounts of money in making improvements. · The 
government contends that as a result of one of these improve-
ments, the pond's connection to the navigable water in a 
manner approved by the Corps of Engineers, the owner has 
somehow lost one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of 
rights that are commonly characterized as property-the right 
to exclude others. 
Because the factual situation in this case is so different 
from typical ones involved in riparian condemnation cases 
we see little point in tracing the historical development of 
that doctrine here. Indeed, since this Court's decision in 
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967), closely fol-
lowing its decisions in United States v. · Virginia Electric & 
Power Co., 365 U. S. 624, 628 (1961), and United Stat.es v. 
/ 1'win City Power Co., 350 U. S. 222, 226 (1956), the ele-
ments of compensation for which the Government must pay 
when it condemns fast lands riparian to a navigable stream 
has remained largely settled. Distinctions between cases 
such as these, on the one hand, and United States v. Kansas 
City Insurance Co., 399 U. S. 799,808 (1950), may seem fine, 
indeed, in the light of hindsight, but perhaps for the very 
reason that it is hindsight which we now exercise, the shifting 
back and forth of the Court in this area until the most recent 
decisions bears the sound of "Old, unhappy, far off things, and 
battles long ago." 
There is no denying that the strict logic of the more recent 
cases limiting the Government's liability to pay damages for 
· riparian access, if carried to its ultimate conclusion, might 
completely swallow up any private claim for "just compensa-
tion" under the Fifth Amendment ev·en in a situation as 
different from the riparian condemnation cases as this one. 
- -
'18-738-0PINION 
KAISER AETNA v. UNITED STATES 13 
But, as Mr. Justice Holmes observed in a very different 
context, the life of the law has not been logic, it has been 
experience. The navigational servitude, which exists by 
virtue of the Commerce Clause in navigable streams, gives 
rise to an authority in the Government to assure that such 
streams retain their capacity to serve as continuous highways 
for the purpose of navigation in interstate commerce. Thus, 
when the Government acquires fast lands to improve naviga-
tion, it is not required under the Eminent Domain Clause to 
compensate land owners for certain elements of damage 
attributable to riparian location, such as the land's value as a 
hydro-electric site, Twin City Power Co., supra, or a port site, 
United States v. Rands, supra. But none of these cases ever 
doubted that when the Government wished to acquire fast 
lands, it was required by the Eminent Domain Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment to condemn and pay fair value for that 
interest. See United Statts v. Kansas City Life Insurance 
Co., supra, at 800 (1950); United States v. Virginia Electric & 
Power Co., 365 U. S., at 628 (1961); United States v. Rands, 
389 U. S., at 123 (1967). The nature of the navigational 
servitude when invoked by the Government in condemnation 
cases is summarized as well as anywhere in United States v. 
Willow River Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502: 
"It is clear, of course, that a head of water has value and 
that the Company has an economic interest in keeping 
the St. Croix at the lower level. But not all economic 
interest are 'property rights'; only those economic ad-
vantages are 'rights' which have the law back of them, 
and only when they are so recognized may courts compel 
others to forbear from interfering with them or to com-
pensate for their invasion." 
We think, however, that when the Government makes the 
naked assertion it does here, that assertion collides with not 
merely an "economic advantage" but an "economic advan-
tage" that has the Jaw back of it to such an extent that cour-tf3_ 
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may ttcompel others to forbear from interfering with [it] or 
to compensate for [its] invasion." United States v. Willow 
River Co., supra, 502. 
Here the Government's attempt to create a public right of 
access to the improved pond goes so far beyond ordinary regu-
lation or improvement for navigation as to amount to a tak-
ing under the logic of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. ·Mahon, supra. 
More than one factor contributes to this result.9 It is clear 
that prior to its improvement, Kuapa Pond was incapable of 
being used as a continuous high\vay for the purpose of navi-
. gation in interstate commerce. Its maximum depth at high 
tide was a mere two feet, it was separated from the adjacent 
bay and ocean by a natural barrier beach, and its principal 
commercial value was limited to fishing.1° It consequently is 
not the sort of "great navigable stream" that this Court has 
previously recognized as being "[in] capable of private owner-
ship." See, e. g., · United States v. ·chandler-Dunbar, supra, 
389 U. S., at 66; United States v. Twin City Power Co., supra, 
350 U. S., at 228. And, as previously noted, Kuapa Pond has 
always been considered to be private property under Hawaiian 
law. Thus, the interest of petitioners in the now dredged 
marina is strinkingly similar to that of owners of fast land 
adjacent to navigable water. 
We have not the slightest doubt that the Government could 
have refused to allow such · dredging on the ground that it 
would have impaired navigation in the bay,-or could have con-
ditioned its approval of the dredging on petitioners' agree-
ment to con:iply with various measures that it deemed appro-
priate for the promotion of navigation. But what petitioners 
/ 
9 We do not decide, however, whether in some circumstances one of these 
factors by itself may be disposit ive. 
10 While it was :;till a fish pond, a few flat-bottomed shallow draft boats 
were operated by the fo;hermen in their work. There is no evidence, how-
ever, that everi these boats could acquire access to the adjacent bay and 
ocean · from the pond. 
- -
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·now have is a body of water that was private property under 
Hawaiian law, linked to navigable water by a channel dredged 
by them with the consent of the respondent. 1:Vhile the con-
sent of indivdual officials representing the United States can-
\ not "estop" the United States, see Montana v. Kennedy, 366 
j U. s. 308, 314-315 (1968); INS V. Hibi, 414 U. S. 5 (1973) , 
it can lead to the fruition of a number of expectancies em-
bodied in the concept of "property,"-expectancies that, if 
sufficiently important. the Government must condemn and 
pay for before it takes over the management of the land 
owner's property. In this case, we hold that the "right to 
exclude," so universally held to be a fundamental element of 
the property right,11 falls within this category of interests that 
the Government cannot take without compensation. This is 
not a case in which the Government is exercising its regu-
latory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial 
devaluation of petitioners' private property, or in which the 
Government has misrepresented the scope of its authority ; 
rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in this 
context will result in an actual physical invasion of the pri-
vately owned marina. Compare Andrus v. Allard, No. 78-
740, slip op., at 14-15, with the traditional taking of fee 
interests in United States ex rel. TV A v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 
266 (1943) , and in United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369 
(1943). And even if the Government physically invades only 
an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just com-
pensation. See United Btates v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 265 
(1946); Portsmouth Co. v. United States, 260 U. S. 327 
(1922). Thus, if the Government wishes to make what 
was formerly Kuapa Pond into a public aquatic park after 
11 See, e. g .. United States v. Pueblo of San Ilde fonso, 513 F . 2d 1383, 
1394 (U. S. Ct. Cl. 1975) ; United States v. Lutz, 295 F . 2d 736, 740 (CA5 
1961). As stated by Justice Bra.ndeis, "An essential Plement of individual 
p roperty is the legal right to exclude others from en joying it." Inter-
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petitioners have proceeded as far as they have here, it may 
not, without invoking its eminent domain pow~ •ai.tl, paying 
just compensation, require them to allow free access to the 
dredged pond while petitioners' agreement with , their cus-
tomers calls for an annual $72 regular fee. 
Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
-
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